





:: ORDER IN APPEAL ::

M/s. Reliance Defense and Engineering Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as M/s. Pivaya Defense and Offshore Eng. Co. Limited (SEZ) Pivaya Port, Post - Jachaga Va - Rajula Dist - Anzeli, (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellant') filed appeal against the Order in Original No. POC9/2017 dated 28.5.2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'the impugned order') passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Service Tax Division, Gandhinagar (hereinafter referred to as 'the lower adjudicating authority').

2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant holding Service Tax registration No. AABCP151SD003 files refund claim of Rs.2,10,10,525/- under Notification No. 12/2013-01 dated 01.07.2013 for the service tax paid to the service providers for the specified services used in authorized zone areas in the SEZ for the period from Oct. 2016 to Dec 2016. The main adjudicating authority vide letter dated 26.05.2017 communicated discrepancies found in the refund claim in light of Notification 12/2013-01 dated 01.07.2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said notification'). After considering reply and submissions coming persons bearing the same was decided vide the impugned order wherein an amount of Rs. 28,43,282/- was rejected on various grounds.

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal against the impugned order to the extent of rejection of refund of Rs. 28,43,282/-, insofar as the following grounds -

3.1 The impugned order is ex facie erroneous and suffers from legal deficiency as well as arithmetical discrepancy; that they had filed refund claim of Rs.2,10,10,525/-, that they had agreed for curtailment of refund by Rs.1,31,31,016/-; that therefore, they were entitled to get refund of Rs.2,08,79,435/-. However, the adjudicating authority sanctioned refund of Rs.1,81,67,262/- and rejected refund of Rs. 28,43,282/-; that adjudicating authority erred in rejecting refund claim of Rs. 28,43,282/- against actual rejection of Rs. 27,10,257/- and figure of the rejection is incorrect.

3.2 Refund of service tax amount of Rs. 18,78,251 (Query No. No 1,2 and 3B or task) paid towards insurance or hiring of tug calling under supply of tangible goods is rejected on the ground that the said service falls under Ship Management Service which is not covered in the list of approved service for SEZ unit. The appellant submitted that the main adjudicating authority erred in holding that hiring of tug falls under 'ship management service' as approved

scope of Work stipulated at Annexure A to Work Order specifying that Tags were like on a monthly basis; the appellant submitted copies of work order No. 15-18009000718 dated 17.02.2016 and work order No. 15-18009000956 dated 31.03.2016 wherein the contract work has been mentioned as inclusion of Service Tax @ 4% + Special Direct Cost @ 0.00%; that the items mentioned in the work order prove that tags were taken on hire on monthly basis and it falls under the category of 'supply of tangible goods' which was in the list of specified service approved by the committee of K&S&Z that plain reading of the definition of taxable service under sub clause (xxvii) of section 65(100) of the Act make it very clear that above taxable service received by them was in the nature of 'Supply of tangible goods' and not 'Shop Management' service and the same is in the spirit of law approved by the special committee.

3.5 Refund amount of Rs. 7,98,488/- is reported on the ground of being time barred that the appellant vide letter dated 15.03.2017 had requested the adjudicating authority for consideration of delay as delay was caused due to change in software. That adjudicating authority simply reiterated his findings of earlier order, that order of rejection of refund claim on the ground of time barred is without taking into consideration the relevant provisions of law and in particular Notification No. 12/2013-S.T. dated 01.07.2013. It is the user adjudicating authority has not ever disclosed in the impugned order as to how and under which Section of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or the Finance Act, 1994 appellant's claim was considered as time barred. That it is a 90% unit and had filed return with proper reference to terms of provisions of Notification No. 12/2013-S.T. dated 01.07.2013 and in particular Para II (g) of the said Notification in respect of amount of service tax paid by appellant on the services received and used for automated operations that therefore, since time limit for filing refund claim within one year as mentioned under Section 110 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is not applicable in the present case in as much as Para II (g) stipulates to file refund claim within one year from the end of the month in which actual payment of service tax was made by it and at the same time, it also provides that even refund claim may be filed within such extended period as the Assistant Commissioner or Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, shall permit; that similarly the said clause of notification does not require the assessee to give any reason for late filing of the claim and it also does not specifically mention that it is discretionary power of the Assistant Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner to permit or to disallow the delay consideration, that it only empowers the authority to extend the period for filing the claim that the adjudicating authority was duty bound to permit filing of

refund claim beyond one year as the word "shall" is used before the word "cannot" and even if he was not satisfied with the explanation of appellant, he ought to have issued SON to the interest of justice before rejecting the claim under reference. Therefore, order was unlawful. The appellant relies upon decision in the case of Mrs. APK Identification Vs COE, Morla reported as 2012(27) STR 20 (Trials). The appellant further relies decision of Commissioner (Appeals) in their own case decided vide OA NO. 39R-EXCISE-000-APP-50 TO 54/14 to dated 21.11.2014 wherein decision of APK IDENTIFICATION Vs IRS was relied upon, that there is no major difference in the situation and facts prevailing in the present case as well as in the above mentioned case decided by Hon'ble Commissioner (Appeals) except for the amount of refund; that however, adjudicating authority appeared to have misinterpreted the law on imaginary grounds.

3.3. Adjudicating authority takes to appreciate that request for extension of time limit can only be made after the time limit has expired and the appellant also does not aver that claimant is at fault to apply for such extension in advance. Appellant further submits that request for extension of time limit or its condone delay can only be made after any claim is filed after expiry of reasonable period. But in other words, such request cannot be made prior to filing of the claim; that factors expressed in the impugned order are considered to be mere for sake of argument, in that case appellant was required to file applications for extension in respect of each of the invoice covered under the refund application during the period from October, 2010 to December, 2013 before these invoices crossed expiry date of one year, that the adjudicating authority might have taken note of a single example that in case claim an appeal is being filed either by an assessee or the department before Commissioner (Appeals) or DSTAT after expiry of stipulated time, application for extension of time is also filed simultaneously with the appeal, that the appellate authority in such cases does not insist that such application should be filed before expiry of specified time limit despite the fact that statutory provision nowhere talks of such time extension, that besides even if allegation that request for extension was not made with the refund application but was made at a later stage in reply to query is considered to be for sake of argument, even in that case substantial benefit cannot be denied for such procedural lapse.

3.3.2 They further argued that Division-Asola dated 20.11.2014 of Commissioner (Appeals) is still in force according to which refund claim cannot be considered as time barred and shall not be denied for some procedural lapses.

on the grounds detailed in the impugned order. It is in respect of transactions with the service providers on regular terms. It makes lump sum payments in parts from time to time; that such practice is a common phenomenon followed by the trade in general, that payment in such cases is not made normally in one instalment but it is made in two or more instalments; that however, refund claim in respect of such transactions is filed only after final payment against a particular invoice of service provider is settled; that the Department has never query for such payments vide letter dated 05/05/2017. The Taxer adjudicating authority failed to take note of the provisions of the said Notification, as amended, especially clause (d), (e) and (f) of Paragraph 3(III). The appeal is explained as under:-

- (i) As per the provisions of clause (d) the amount (including tax) payable in invoice including the service tax payable thereon shall have been paid to the person liable to pay the service tax thereon; and as per clause (e), the refund claim shall be filed within one year from the end of the month in which actual payment of service tax was made to the service provider, and as per clause (f), the SEZ Unit shall submit only one claim of refund under this notification for every quarter.
- (ii) In the business, practically it was impossible to fulfil all the three procedure and conditions. In the business lump sum payments are being made in instalments. Even in case of ongoing or continuous receipt of services payments are made without relating specific invoice. So while complying one procedure and condition, other may not be fulfilled by the claimant. For the very reasons in clause (g) it is provided that SEZ Unit as the case may be shall permit to file claim within one year with in amended order.

*Prasanna*

7.4. Return of Rs.48,507/- was rejected on the grounds that Appellant did not submit the larger proof of payments for query at Sl. No. 43. But Appellant had submitted invoice No. 10914-15 dated 22/05/2015 with passing (Accountant) Voucher and Journal Voucher passing the entry in ledger to prove that Total Payment of Rs.5,62,116/- towards invoice No. 10914-15 dated 22/05/2015 is sufficient to pay payment of service tax; that Journal Voucher indicating proof of payment against DCI no. 10922.E.2215 was not considered by the adjudicating authority.

4. Personal hearing in the matter was attended to by Sr. P.D. Kanchan, Advocate on behalf of the appellant wherein he reiterated the ground of appeal & stated that refund of Rs.48,55,200/- was rejected towards supply of tangible

goods is covered by Commissioner (Appeals) earlier Order dated 30.04.2018 wherein Department has considered the service as 'Ship Management Services' based on Invoice or Receipt or Service; that out of refund of Rs.7,90,413/- rejected on the ground of Time Barred, in fact, Rs.2,83,886/- only is time barred and balance amount is not time barred as explained in Appeal Memo which is also decided in another case by Commissioner (Appeals) Order dated 20.04.2018; that refund of Rs.49,074/- of Service tax was rejected on ground of amount no. matching with other details and ledger no. submitted, which were in fact submitted and again submitted as per grounds of Appeal of the Appax Memorandum.

### FINDINGS

5. I have carefully gone through the facts of the case, the impugned order and submissions made by the appellant in grounds of appeal as well as written submission & during the course of personal hearing. I find that the issue involved is common dispute arising & wholly was covered in existing different refund amounts claimed under Notification no. 12/2011-1 dated 01.03.2012 on the stated grounds or not?

6. The appellant has pointed out that the refund of Rs.24,43,083/- was rejected and the impugned order however they are now contesting for refund amount of Rs.27,11,267/- only on the grounds decided in the present appeal and they accept rejection of refund of Rs.6,62,616/- in respect of Invoice issued by Erisson & Richard, Inc and had already claimed Rs.1,17,250/- of refund at adjudication level.

7. The appellant contended that refund of Rs.8,79,231/- in respect of service tax on services of hiring of tug is rejected on the ground that the same rate under 'Ship Management Services' which is not in the list of approved service for SIZ unit. The appellant also submitted that hiring of tug cannot be classified as Ship Management Service as tugs were taken on hire on monthly basis and it falls under the category of 'Supply of Tangible Goods' which was already in the list of sanctioned service approved by the Committee. I find that appellant has produced three previous Work Order nos. 10-16(SA)1833/18 dated 21.05.2018, 18-14(SA)2001/19 dated 20.06.2018 and 18-17(SA)2001/11 dated 01.09.2018 issued to M/s. A. K. Ship Management & Services, Mumbai wherein the service description has been mentioned as under.

Work Order No. 15 (020300000000 - 11/03/2018 and 18 (180300000000 dated 20/03/2018)

\*Rate of Fixed cost for providing Tugs of capacity 400000000 per month on hire basis including fuel for auxiliary engine, fresh water, etc. unless:

Remarks: 2 Nos Tug Required for Winco's Vessel's Movement in RDEL Basin

02 Tugs for 02 (Two) Months.

Service Req. from date: ( ) to: ( )

Work Order No. 16 (020300000000 - 11/03/2018)

\*Mobilization & Demobilization of Tug

Service Req. from date: 10.09.2018 to Date: 16.09.2018

Rating of Tug: Capacity 400000000 per month on sea going basis

Service Req. from date: 10.09.2018 to 16.09.2018

7.1 It is to examine the definition of Ship Management Services and Supply of Tugable Goods services to decide the proper service, which are reproduced below for ready reference.

#### Ship Management Service:

As per Section 65 (56) of the Finance Act, 1994 "Ship" means a sea going vessel and includes a sailing vessel.

As per Section 65(56a) of the Finance Act, 1994:

"Ship management services" includes -

- (i) the supervision of the maintenance, survey and repair of ship;
- (ii) engagement or providing of crew;
- (iii) receiving the hire or freight charges on behalf of the owner;
- (iv) arrangements for loading and unloading;
- (v) providing for discharging or stowage of ship;
- (vi) negotiating contracts for bunker fuel and chartering of;
- (vii) payment on behalf of the owner of expenses incurred in providing services or in relation to the management of ship;
- (viii) the entry of ship in a port or in assembly areas and
- (ix) dealing with insurance, claims and other claims and
- (x) arranging of insurance in relation to ship.

As per Section 65(105)(aa) of the Finance Act, 1994:

"Taxable service" means any service provided or to be provided to any



person), under a contract or an agreement, by any other person in relation to ship management services.”

#### Supply of Tangible Goods Services:

“As per Section 25(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 ‘Tangible Service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment, and appliances.”

7.2 On going through both the definitions, it is amply clear that the services received by the appellant merits classification under ‘Supply of Tangible Goods Services’ and not under ‘Ship Management Services’ since there is no mention of hiring of tangible goods in the definition of ‘Ship Management Services’. Further, Government of India, Department of Revenue vide order D.O. F. No.33/112003-TRU dated 26th February, 2003 has clarified as under:

#### 4.4 SUPPLY OF TANGIBLE GOODS FOR USE-

4.4.1 Transfer of the right to use any goods (example is sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods [Article 356,29A)(c) of the Constitution of India], Transfer of right to use, does not transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods.

4.4.2 Excavators, wheel barrows, dump trucks, crawler cranes, compactors, equipment, cranes, etc., although construction vessels & barges, gas technical vessels, tug and tugs, tugboats, jigs and jig value machines, etc. supplied for use, do not transfer of possession and effective control, transaction or allowing another person to use the goods, without giving legal right of possession and effective control, not being treated as sale of goods, is treated as service.

4.4.2 Proposed is to levy service tax on such services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances, for use, with no legal right of possession or effective control. Supply of tangible goods for use and results to VAT or sales tax as deemed sale of goods, is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of facts and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertainable from the fact of either or not VAT is payable or paid.”

7.2 In the case of *Indian National Ship Owners Association Vs. Union of India* reported as 2009 (14) 8 T.R. 4261 (Ben), it was held that providing vessels on time charter basis without giving effective control was covered under 68(10)(zzzz) and not under service (zzzz). The same decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as 2011 (96) 8 T.R. 1003 (S.C.). Therefore, in view of clarification issued by TRU as well as judgments of the Hon'ble Courts, the services received by the appellant are

under the email of 'Supply of Tangible Goods Service' and not under 'Ship Management Services'. The supply of tangible goods service is in the list of Approved Services for SHZ unit of the appellant I, therefore, hold that Refund of Rs.15,75,207 is admissible to the appellant and allow the appeal to this extent.

8. In appeal no. 666/2017 the rejection of Refund of Rs. 1,08,4885 as time barred is not correct and for this they heavily relied upon the notification, which says that word "shall" is treated as power of extension of time that delegated to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be. The appellant also stated that the Refund claim is not time barred as they have made the payment in two or more instalments to the service provider that they made lump sum payment in parts and payment is not made means one at a time and return was denied concerning the last instalment. The appellant also submits that due to change in their software they could not file return. In this case they requested the adjudicating authority for condonation of delay. I observe that the appellant while accepting the delay, has contended that the substantive benefit should not be denied for procedural aspects in absence of substantial grounds. I find that the adjudicating authority has summarily rejected the request for condonation of delay without assigning any reasons. The adjudicating authority has not recorded any valid reason for rejecting the request. I find that Para 3 (c) of the notification 1221.13-SI reads as under:-

*'(c) The amount (or refund) shall be filed within one year from the end of five months in which actual payment of service tax was made by such Dealers or SHZ Unit to the registered service provider or such related party as the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, shall permit.'*

(Enclosure supplied)

8.1 From above it is clear that the language of Notification is unambiguous and specifically says that the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner shall admit the period extension of to file the claim. Thus, discretion vested is not absolute and exercise of power is required to be used with just and reasonable reasons and those reasons had to be recorded by the lower adjudicating authority. I also find that the decision in the matter of *M/s. SSK Identification* reported as 2017 (27) STR 25 (Tri. Del.) relied upon by the appellant is very recent and also applicable in this case. The Hon'ble CESTAT has, inter-alia, held that adjudicating authority was expected to exercise the power unless there is a reason for not exercising such power. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:-

"4. Concerning the arguments in para 6.1, I do not agree with the argument that the delay in the Maharashtra dated 13/11/2017 cannot be made applicable to the claim filed before me due to pending on that date. I rely on the fact that even under the earlier notification, the Deputy Commissioner has power to condone the delay. The delay availed was only 17 days and unless a higher authority is given any power, he is expected to exercise it unless there is a reason for not exercising such power. (Ms. Reson has been recorded in the impugned order in the fact circumstances of the case. I consider that this is a case where he should have exercised the power as per the provision of Notification No. 172011-S T, dated 1-2-2017 which was in force on the date when he issued the order. I hold that the claims are not time-barred and the matter is remanded to the adjudicating authority to decide the claim itself, on the merits of the claim."

(Emphasis supplied)

8.2 The adjudicating authority in his order did not state any reason for not exercising this given power and for rejecting the substantive benefit of refund of the excise tax. I find considerable force in the appellant's submission in absence of any recorded reasons in the impugned order where refund claim is otherwise admissible to the appellant in relation to the different set of services used for manufacture of exported goods. I am of considered view that the appellant cannot be deprived of their legitimate and substantive benefit of refund for the payments made on the export of goods, utilization of the services and payment of service tax are not disputed. Also my an order of the Joint Secretary (Dy), Government of Maharashtra in the case of Ms. Modern Process Printers reported as 2011/2014/HT/0362 wherein it was stated as follows:-

"5.3 ... in fact, as regards refund specifically, it is not a matter over which the procedural inflexibility of the Customs Excise duties act can be exercised if exports have really taken place, and the law is settled that the substantive benefit ought to be given for procedural lapses. A procedure has been prescribed to facilitate satisfaction of substantive requirements. The core aspect or fundamental requirement for rebate is its manufacture and subsequent export. As soon as this requirement is met, other procedural obligations can be condoned."

(Emphasis supplied)

8.3 I, therefore, hold that the adjudicating authority needs to re-examine the facts on record to arrive at its more decision and I remand the matter of refund of Rs. 4,43,87/- back to the jurisdictional adjudicating authority, who will consider all facts and decide refund or merits thereof in the light of findings in Para 3 to 3.2 of this regard.

8.4 The refund of Rs. 4,43,87/- has been created on the ground that credit of payment (ledger) has not been submitted by the appellants. As appellant's claim that they have submitted bill (invoice) (authorised) voucher and Journal Voucher passing the entry in ledger indicating proof of payment. I find that journal

voucher no. 41500.00-42 dated 21.10.2018 produced before me that a cred. entry has been made towards bill payment against bill No. 109/22.5.2015 and part payment against 5087 as per recd. by Appellant. I find no reason to reject the Journal Voucher unless any counter evidence is available challenging this accounting entry in the books of Appellant. I therefore find that Appellant has provided accounting entry showing proof of payment. It is not fair and just unreasonable to impose the appeal from such negative facts. I, therefore, allow appeal for Refund of Rs.40,500/- to the appellant.

13. In view of the above facts and circumstances, I allow appeal for refund of Rs. 16,75,231/- as per Para 7 to 7.3, refund of Rs.7,00,435/- by way of demand to be decided afresh as per Para 9 to 9.3 and refund of Rs.16,557/- as per Para 8 above.

14. अपीलकर्ता द्वारा उक्त की गई अपील का निष्पत्ति अटॉर्नय लॉयर्स से किया जाता है।

15. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed as above.

By R.P.A.D.

In,

M/s. Ramesh Distances and  
Engineering Co. ; - earlier known as  
M/s. Ramesh Defense and Distances  
Eng. Co. (Private)  
Haveli, Fort, Rajula  
District Am. 64398780 (Gujarat)

म. रमेश डिस्टेंस एवं इंजिनियरिंग  
लिमिटेड (पहले का पिछला डेस्टेंस एंड  
आण्ड और इंजिनियरिंग कम्पनी प्राईवेट लिमिटेड)  
रेजाजी फोर्ट, राजुला  
जिला - अहमदाबाद-382300.

आयुक्त (अपीलेंस)

Copy for information and necessary action to:-

1. The Chief Commissioner, GST & Central Excise, Ahmedabad zone Ahmedabad for his kind information.
  2. The Commissioner, GST & Central Excise, Baramagar Commissionerate Baramagar.
  3. The Assistant Commissioner, GST & Central Excise, Jeshin Amrit
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